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The Importance of a Clearly Defined Policy Goal for AAU Trading
Elizabeth Aldrich, M.S., Ph.D.
Boise State University
International Emission Trading (IET) has been a key element of the cost-containing flexible mechanisms of the
Kyoto Protocol and could prove to be a useful tool in the future. However, trading of AAUs from countries whose
emissions have declined since their baseline year under the Kyoto Protocol has led critics to be skeptical of carbon
markets due to the lack of actual emission reductions that occur as a result of these trades.
The overall size of the AAU market is staggering. Altogether, the former Soviet Union countries and Eastern Europe
have emissions that are 35% below 1990 levels, i leaving approximately 13 Gt CO2 of surplus metric tons of carbon
dioxide equivalence to sell. ii The baseline year of 1990 was selected for most countries except those in the process
of transitioning to a market economy. These transitioning countries were able to choose their baseline year. iii The
year 1990 was particularly advantageous to parts of Eastern Europe and Russia, which had a heavy industrial year in
1990 before the Soviet Union dissolved completely in 1991. Given the recent economic downturn, the 13 billion
surplus AAUs could fulfill all required commitments by 2012, and the market would still be oversupplied by 9
billion AAUs. And, assuming that countries take on the targets they have discussed in negotiations, this surplus
could fill reduction targets until 2020, and there would still be 6.9 billion excess AAUs. iv
Green Investment Schemes (GISs) are meant to try to allay the fears of those that think there is no environmental
integrity in AAU trading by using the proceeds of AAU trades to create projects that absorb or reduce greenhouse
gases. However, these GISs have no required criteria for crediting and actual determination of what qualifies as a
GIS is left up to the discretion of the buying and selling countries. Inconsistent application of GISs as AAU trades
ramp up toward 2012 when the Kyoto Protocol ends and post-2012 during the next global greenhouse gas accord
could erode the price of emission reductions and allowances worldwide and may elicit a harsh rebuke from those
concerned with reductions in current emissions.
The wide-ranging results of AAU trades include the promotion of projects that encourage emission reductions but
do not ensure them on a one-to-one basis; creation of projects that attempt to yield an emission reduction for each
AAU sold; and satisfaction of Kyoto targets with below-market priced permits to pollute that do not represent any
emission reductions. Policy makers need to clearly define the goal of AAU trading as 1) a way to address current
carbon market failures through promotion of “soft” greening projects; 2) a means to promote investment in a selling
country; 3) a trade that must be accompanied by a one-to-one emission reduction project; or 4) a scheme to promote
cost containment in the next global agreement and create an accord that effectively achieves the goal selected.
If the goal of IET post-2012 remains to provide Annex B countries with a means “of fulfilling their commitments,”
then perhaps no changes to the way the AAUs are traded, baseline years chosen, and future targets should be
required. The Swiss firm Interblue took advantage of cheap AAUs in a purchase of 15 million AAUs from Slovakia
for the price of €5.05, half market value. v There was no GIS to back up this AAU trade, and the price reflected it. If
a “hard” greening GIS project that resulted in emission reductions on a one-to-one basis with AAUs sold was
required, the price of the AAUs would have certainly been higher. This purely market-driven cost containment
measure will produce revenues for EIT and help reduce the cost of compliance, perhaps at the risk of not achieving
sufficient greenhouse gas reduction.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which assesses the scientific, technical and socio-economic
information relevant for the understanding of the risk of human-induced climate change, has determined that
emission cuts of 25-40% below 1990 levels are necessary in order to prevent catastrophic climate change and
experience 2 degrees of warming by 2100. Inclusion of excess AAUs into existing and future global frameworks for
reductions would mean that Annex I countries would only cut emissions between 5-13%. vi
If the goal of IET is to address the market failures of the Kyoto Protocol and replace or complement Nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Actions, then perhaps GISs that provide “soft” greening GIS projects that support sectors
that cannot be traditionally supported by CDM or JI due to strict additionality and monitoring and verification
requirements. It is typically not possible to monitor the emission reductions from “soft” GIS projects in a precise
way, but these projects represent important steps towards reducing a country’s greenhouse gases.“Soft” GISs are
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meant to support greenhouse gas reduction activities that take the form of energy efficiency programs, loan
guarantees for projects that absorb or reduce emissions, or customer incentives to engage in activities that use less
greenhouse gases.
If the goal of IET is to stimulate investment in a country and ensure that emission reductions are created for each
AAU sold, then only GISs that include “hard” green projects that produce a one-to-one relationship of emission
reductions created per AAU sold should be allowed and a standardized way of evaluating and monitoring these
projects should be created.Examples of “hard” greening projects supported by Estonia include improvement of
district heating networks, boiler house rehabilitation, industrial energy efficiency, and public transportation
projects. vii
Countries have not been consistent with the type of greening scheme that is accepted by their country. The Ukraine
is now considering soft greening schemes whereas the country previously stated that it would only accept “hard”
greened projects. Hungary has stated that it supports only “hard” greened projects, but it recently stated that it may
use AAUs for a budget crisis instead of emission reduction projects. viii Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria,
Lithuania, and Russia have not finished setting up systems to administer GISs. ix
Apart from the argument that AAU trades should have a GIS for environmental reasons, there is an economic
argument for GISs to back up these exchanges. AAU trades that are not backed by a green activity have the ability
to erode the price of carbon towards the end of the Kyoto compliance period. If a project is not required to produce
any environmental benefit, then the opportunity for trades well below market price, which is set by the cost of
making a metric ton of reduction elsewhere in the world, will abound. And, some market critics have claimed that
only “hard” greening projects should be accepted since “soft” GISs could still cost less than other compliance
instruments since there is not attempt to monitor and verify the emission reductions created.
Deciding on the purpose of AAU trades in future greenhouse gas markets will help market designers to also make
decisions about how to best control the impact that the surplus AAUs will have on the price of future compliance
instruments and the environmental effectiveness of this legislation. To control the impact that surplus AAUs would
have on future greenhouse gas markets, market designers could mandate that AAUs 1) always accompany “hard” or
“soft” GISs; 2) be allowed for banking into the future compliance period; 2) not be allowed at all for use after 2012;
3) be allowed for only domestic emission reduction goals after 2012; or 4) be allowed for limited trades. x The
scenario selected will be determined in part by the overall policy goal for AAU trades in a future framework.
It is essential that a decision on the status of surplus AAUs for a post-Kyoto framework be made quickly as it will
have implications on the 2011 and 2012 price of carbon as countries with surplus AAUs move to either sell them on
the market or hold them for future compliance periods. In the absence of a decision, countries with AAUs to sell
may take advantage of the lack of regulation on GISs and simply dump AAUs with no environmental backing on the
market. In the process of making the Kyoto Protocol palatable to all countries by providing a high degree of
sovereignty to countries in their implementation of rules to support AAU trades, market designers have created the
risk of undermining the entire market.
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